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Misclassification of the dependent variable in binary choice models can result in 
inconsistency of the parameter estimates.  I estimate probit models that treat 
misclassification probabilities as estimable parameters for three labor market outcomes: 
formal sector employment, pension contribution and job change.  I use Living Standards 
Measurement Study data from Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala and Panama.   I find 
that there is significant misclassification in eleven of the sixteen cases that I investigate.   
If misclassification is present but is ignored, estimates of the probit parameters and their 
standard errors are biased toward zero.   In most cases, predicted probabilities of the 
outcomes are significantly affected by misclassification of the dependent variable.       
Even a moderate degree of misclassification can have substantial effects on the estimated 
parameters and on many of the predictions. 
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Introduction. 
      There are many labor market outcomes that are discrete and may be modeled by 
regression models in which the dependent variable is binary.  Such discrete outcomes 
include employment in a particular sector of the economy, contribution by a worker to a 
pension plan, and job change.  The regression models relate how worker characteristics 
affect the probability of a binary outcome.  The probit model is commonly used to model 
binary outcomes.  It is well known that misclassification of the binary dependent variable 
can result in inconsistent probit estimates.  How prevalent is misclassification and how 
severe is the bias in probit models estimated with developing country data?    
      This paper investigates these data quality questions for three labor market outcomes 
for individuals: formal sector employment, pension contribution and job change using 
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) data from five Latin American countries: 
Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala and Panama.  Employment in the formal sector may 
convey information about job quality or flexibility.   Pension contribution may also be a 
job quality indicator but is also of interest in its own right, for example if one is interested 
in future old-age support.  Job change is of interest if one is interested in labor market 
flexibility or labor mobility.  LSMS data have been used in previous empirical studies 
that model binary outcomes and it is useful to know more about the quality of these data.  
Using several LSMS surveys and studying several binary outcomes, provides a fuller 
picture of the extent and consequences of misclassification than one could obtain from a 
more limited selection of data sets and outcomes. 
      Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) proposed a method to control for 
misclassification of the binary dependent variable in binary choice models such as probit.    4 
The method considers two probabilities of misclassification:  the probability that a “one” 
is misclassified as a “zero” and the probability that a “zero” is misclassified as a “one”.  
These probabilities are treated as parameters that are estimated along with the other 
coefficients of the model.  This is done within the framework of a more general model 
that has the conventional probit model with no misclassification as a special case.   
      I estimate probit models with and without misclassification for the three outcomes 
using data from the five countries.   I estimate significant misclassification probabilities 
in the majority of cases.   I find that misclassification biases parameters toward zero.  
Even moderate misclassification probabilities can have substantial effects on parameter 
estimates and predicted probabilities in many of the cases I investigate.   
Methodology. 
      Suppose we have a discrete choice regression model  
                                     yi
*=xi’ß + ei                             
where yi
* is
 a latent variable.  Suppose that the true outcome is ?i (one or zero).  We have 
?i = 1 if yi
* > 0 and ?i = 0 otherwise.   If e i is normally distributed, we have the probit 
model Pr(?i = 1 ) = ?(xi’ß ).  Suppose that the dependent variable is, however, 
misclassified in a proportion of the cases.   The observed outcome is yi and the 
misclassification probabilities are  
                                     a0= Pr(yi = 1 | ?i = 0),  
                                     a1= Pr(yi = 0 | ?i = 1). 
a0 is the probability that a reported (observed) value of one is truly a zero, a1 is the 
probability that a reported (observed) value of zero is truly a one.   5 
The expected value of the observed dependent variable for the probit model with 
misclassification is  
                                     E(yi  |  xi ) =  Pr(yi = 1 |  xi ) =  a0 + (1 - a0  -a1)? (xi’ß)            
The expected value of the true dependent variable ?i is the last term of the above 
expression.  The parameters a0, a1 and ß can be estimated by maximizing the log-
likelihood function 
         
n 
(1/n) ? ln(a0 + (1 - a0  -a1)? (xi’ß)) + (1- yi) ln(1- a0 + (1 - a0  -a1)? (xi’ß))]     
        i=1 
The condition a0 + a1< 1 is required for identification.  The equality of a0 and a1 is 
testable.  If there is no misclassification, then a0 = a1 = 0 and the model collapses to 
probit without mislassification.  The misclassification parameters have the potential to 
allow us to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters.  An alternative interpretation of 
the parameters a0 and a1 is as measures of heterogeneity.  Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-
Morton (1998), who proposed this model, discuss its properties in detail.  Previous 
studies that have applied this model include Artís, Ayuso and Guillén (2002) who studied 
automobile insurance fraud, Kenkel, Lillard and Mathios (2004) who studied smoking 
participation, and Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) who studied job change.  
Perspectives on Measurement Error. 
      How extensive is measurement error in the LSMS surveys?  How reliable is the probit 
model with misclassification in detecting measurement error in a binary dependent 
variable?  One can address such questions by using longitudinal data.  These data make it 
possible to examine reported changes over time in variables that either should not change 
at all or should not change in particular ways.   The LSMS data from Nicaragua and from   6 
Peru have longitudinal information and are useful in giving pespectives on measurement 
error. 
      To form an initial impression of the extent of likely measurement error before 
estimating a model, I consider some reported changes over time in gender, birth year and 
schooling in the LSMS data from Nicaragua and from Peru.  Some individuals in the 
Nicaraguan survey were interviewed in 1998 and in 2001.   Some individuals in the 
Peruvian survey were interviewed in 1994 and 1997.  Table 1 refers to individuals who, 
according to the surveys, are the same person observed in two different years.  In both 
data sets a small proportion of individuals are reported to be of a different gender in 
different years. However, about a third of individuals in the Nicaraguan data and nearly a 
quarter in the Peruvian data report a different birth year in the two rounds of the survey.  
Among individuals who were 15 years of age or older in the second year of the survey 
and who reported the same gender and birth year, a quarter of Nicaraguans and nearly a 
fifth of Peruvians reported a decline in schooling over time or an increase greater than the 
number of years since the last survey plus one.   In many cases, there is no way of 
knowing which gender, birth year or schooling level is the correct one, but we can say 
that the gender, birth year and schooling information in these cases is of questionable 
quality.  The questionable quality cases may reflect measurement error in the year that is 
of interest to us.  The proportion of cases with questionable quality birth year or 
schooling information is not small.   
      In order to reduce the impact of measurement error in statistical models that use 
gender, birth year (age) or schooling as regressors, we could drop observations with 
questionable birth year, gender or schooling information.  Alternatively, replacing a   7 
regressor such as schooling that should not change in particular ways but is reported to do 
so by the average of the reported values, as implemented by Schultz (2003), may reduce 
the impact of measurement error.  The method of instrumental variables may also be 
helpful in dealing with measurement error in schooling.    
      In cases where the variable of interest describes a labor market outcome such as 
sector of employment, pension contribution or job change, longitudinal information is not 
helpful in detecting cases with probable measurement error.  The probit model with 
misclassification is useful in cases where the binary labor market outcome is the 
phenomenon to be modeled.  This model can also be applied when only cross sectional 
data are available.  How reliable is the probit model with misclassification?  In other 
words, how can we know that the estimates of the mislassification probabilities are 
plausible?  We can gain insight on this issue by applying the model to a choice where 
longitudinal information is likely to provide an independent measure of the extent of 
probable measurement error.  The Nicaraguan LSMS longitudinal data are especially 
well-suited for this purpose.    
      I consider a threshold number of years of schooling and define a binary variable that 
takes the value one if an individual’s schooling is equal to or greater than the threshold 
and is zero otherwise.  I use the Nicaraguan data, for individuals 25 years of age or older 
in 2001 that have most likely completed their schooling, and for two alternative schooling 
thresholds: 4 years and 8 years as of 2001, the second year of the survey.   This is an 
admittedly artificial way of modeling schooling.  If my primary interest was in modeling 
schooling, I would use the continuous schooling information reported in the data and 
would not convert it into a binary variable.  However, my interest here is in seeing how   8 
reliably a discrete choice model detects the mislassification that longitudinal information 
in the data suggests there is present.  Certain changes in reported schooling over time 
may be questionable and may result in the binary schooling variable (less than 
threshold/equal or greater than threshold) being misclassified.  These changes in 
schooling can be observed in the data and their proportions can be compared to estimated 
misclassification probabilities from a probit model with misclassification.  
       I estimate a probit model with misclassification and obtain maximum likelihood 
estimates of the misclassification parameters a0 = a1 = 0.17 (t-statistic 9.58 and the 95% 
confidence interval is 0.134-0.204)
1 for 4 years of schooling or more, i.e. I estimate that 
17% of cases are misclassified.  I also estimate a0 = a1 = 0.11 (t-statistic 3.75 and the 
95% confidence interval is 0.053-0.167)
2 for 8 years of schooling or more, i.e. 11% of 
cases are misclassified.   Using the longitudinal information in the data we observe that 
for the 4 years threshold, 5.2% of the sample gains schooling from 1998 to 2001 to get to 
1 from 0 even though only three individuals were enrolled in school in 1998.  An 
additional 5.8% of the sample loses schooling between 1998 and 2001 to get to 0 from 1.  
Therefore, 11% of the sample has questionable observed schooling changes and these 
may result in misclassification – a figure that is close to the confidence interval for 
misclassification estimated using the model.  For the 8 years threshold, the longitudinal 
information in the data reveals that 3% of the sample gains schooling to get to 1 from 0 
                                                 
1 Regressors in the model include an intercept, age, age squared, gender, and the 
misclassification parameters.  According to a Wald test the misclassification parameters 
are equal to each other (Pr. = 0.72).  
 
2 According to a Wald test the misclassification parameters are equal to each other (Pr. = 
0.93). 
   9 
and 2% loses schooling to get to 0 from1.  Therefore, 5% of the sample has questionable 
observed schooling changes, a figure that is close to the confidence interval for 
misclassification estimated using the model.  There may be more measurement error in 
the schooling data than suggested by the longitudinal information above, such as 
misclassification relative to the threshold in both years.  In view of these considerations, 
the estimated mislassification probabilities are plausible.
3 
Data and Estimates. 
      I use the Living Standards Measurement Study surveys for Nicaragua (1998), (2001), 
Peru (1994), (1997), Brazil (1996-7), Guatemala (2000), and Panama (1997) to estimate 
models with and without misclassification for three labor market outcomes.  These 
household surveys were carried out by national statistical agencies or local research 
institutes with the collaboration of the World Bank and other international organizations.  
The surveys use similar questionnaires.  I use two survey rounds for Nicaragua and Peru.  
Longitudinal information is available for a subset of individuals for these two countries.  
The other surveys are cross sectional.  Table 2 reports summary statistics.  I study three 
labor market outcomes for individuals: formal sector employment, pension contribution 
and job change in the past year.  For Nicaragua and Peru I study the three labor market 
outcomes in the second year of the survey (2001 and 1997, respectively).  I use 
longitudinal information in these surveys to test for and correct for measurement error in 
the regressors.   
                                                 
3 Similar estimates for Peru could not be obtained.  The sample size of the subset of the 
data with longitudinal information is smaller than for Nicaragua and the model with 
misclassification did not converge. 
   10 
      I define formal sector employment as working for a firm or organization with more 
than five workers or being a self-employed professional.
4  Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla 
and Woodruff (1997) employ a similar definition of the formal sector.  For Brazil a 
second and more direct measure of sector of employment is available: possession of a 
work registration document for employees (carteira assinada) or business license for the 
self-employed.  I use both firm size and work registration/business license as alternatives 
for Brazil.  Marcouiller, Ruiz de Castilla and Woodruff (1997) also use social security 
contribution as an alternative measure of formal sector employment.  In this paper I use 
pension contribution, which includes public as well as private pension plans in Peru and 
Brazil but only (public) social security in Nicaragua and Guatemala.
5  It is likely that 
pension contribution is correlated with employment in the formal sector.  However, the 
introduction of private pension plans in several Latin American countries during the 
1990s may have weakened the correlation between pension contribution and formal 
sector employment.  Job change refers to individuals who were employed in the past 
week and who reported that during the past twelve months they had a job different from 
their current jobs.
6   
      I estimate reduced form probit models with and without misclassification for each of 
the three labor market outcomes and for the five countries.   The regressors include an 
                                                 
4 Major groups 0/1 and 2 of the 1968 International Standard Classification of 
Occupations.   
5 Pension contribution information is not reported for Panama. 
6 The 1997 Peruvian survey asks respondents about other jobs they held during the past 
twelve months other than the current one and the question is asked separately for the 
current primary and secondary job.  The surveys from the other countries ask one 
question about all other jobs other than the current ones held during the past twelve 
months.  It is possible that the way the questions are asked in the Peruvian survey may 
result in some double counting of previous jobs among those who had multiple jobs in 
the past week.   11 
intercept, age and its square, schooling and a binary variable for gender.   I have included 
only regressors that can be defended as being exogenous.   I include individuals age 15 or 
more who report information on all regressors.   
      Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the probit models for employment 
in the formal sector (henceforth formal sector).  The first column reports estimates of the 
model without misclassification and the second column reports estimates of the model 
with misclassification for the five countries.  Table 3 reports estimates for Brazil based 
on the firm size formal sector definition and also estimates based on the work 
registration/business license formal sector criterion.  Table 4 reports the corresponding 
estimates of the pension contribution models and Table 5 reports the corresponding 
estimates of the job change models.  
       I report estimates of the preferred specification for each model.  I arrived at these 
after conducting the following tests: (a) equality of the misspecification parameters (a0 = 
a1) and, after arriving at a preferred specification, (b) for the data from Nicaragua and 
Peru equality of the estimates based on observations on individuals age 15 or more with 
longitudinal information and no change in gender or birth year in the two years with the 
point estimates based on all observations of individuals age 15 or more.  I use the smaller 
longitudinal sample with no changes in reported gender or birth year in order to reduce 
the impact of measurement error in gender or birth year (and age).  If the estimates 
obtained with each sample are not significantly different, I report the more efficient 
estimates from the entire survey.   If the estimates are significantly different, I report 
those from the longitudinal sample with the same reported gender and birth year in both 
years.  Table 6 reports specification test statistics.        12 
      For employment in the formal sector (Table 3) the estimates of the misclassification 
probabilities (a0 and a1) are not significantly different from each other at the 5 percent 
significance level and are equal to 0.073  for both Nicaragua (for 2001) and Peru (for 
1997).   For Brazil (for 1996-1997) estimates of the misclassification probabilities are not 
significantly different from each other and are 0.126 (firm size definition).  Also for 
Brazil, the estimates of the misclassification probabilities of the formal sector model 
using information on work registration or business license are insignificantly different 
from zero for a0 (or true informal) and 0.116 for a1 (or true formal).  According to the 
estimates, a proportion of individuals in the Brazilian survey understate their possession 
of a work registration document or business license.  If individuals behaved strategically 
in order to conceal informal activity and avoid taxation or regulation, they would be 
expected to misreport that they possess a work registration/business license when in truth 
they did not (a0 > a1).  Finding the opposite relationship of the misclassification 
probabilities indicates that in this case misclassification is primarily the result of 
reporting or recording error and not strategic behavior.  For Guatemala the probit model 
with misclassification does not differ significantly at the 5 percent significance level from 
the probit model without misclassification.  For Panama (for 1997) the estimates of the 
misclassification probabilities are not significantly different from each other and are 
0.078.  For four out of the five countries, and both formal sector definitions for Brazil, the 
formal sector model with misclassification differs significantly from the conventional 
probit model without misclassification.  
        For both Nicaragua and Peru the estimates obtained from the larger sample that 
includes all individuals age 15 or older do not differ significantly from the estimates   13 
obtained with the longitudinal sample, age 15 or older with the same reported gender and 
birth year.  This is evidence that measurement error in the gender and age regressors does 
not have a significant effect on the formal sector models for Nicaragua and Peru.   
      The estimated misclassification probabilities for the formal sector model for 
Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil and Panama are moderate, but the effects of misclassification of 
the dependent variable on the estimates the coefficients of other regressors are sizeable.  
The estimates of the parameters of the probit models without misclassification and the 
estimates of their standard errors are biased toward zero relative to the corresponding 
estimates of the models with misclassification.
7  For example, relative to the probit model 
without misclassification the coefficient of schooling in the probit model with 
mislassification changes by 32.4 percent for Nicaragua.  The corresponding relative 
changes to the coefficient of schooling are 61.5 percent for Peru, 46.3 percent for Brazil 
(firm size) or 21.3 percent (work registration/business license) and 37.8 percent for 
Panama.  The corresponding relative changes in the coefficients of age are 71.1 percent 
for Nicaragua, 52.3 percent for Peru, 44 percent for Brazil (firm size), 12.5 percent for 
Brazil (work registration/business license) and 32.2 percent for Panama.  The relative 
changes in the coefficient of gender are 26.4 percent for Nicaragua, 30 percent for Peru, 
57.7 percent for Brazil (firm size), 16 percent for Brazil (work registration/business 
license) and 39.4 percent for Panama.   Similar changes occur in the other coefficients 
when we control for mislassification.  
                                                 
7 Hausman, Abrevaya and Scott-Morton (1998) report Monte Carlo evidence of bias 
toward zero of probit coefficients when misclassification of the dependent variable is 
present.   14 
      The observed proportion of individuals who work in the formal sector in Nicaragua is 
28.2 percent.  The estimated true rate is 34.6 percent.
8  For Peru the observed proportion 
is 26.9 and the estimated true proportion is 30.3 percent.  For Brazil the observed 
proportion in the formal sector is 49.9 percent, according to the firm size criterion, and 
the estimated true proportion is also 49.9 percent.  However when I adjust for 
misclassification, 442 individuals (6.3 percent of the total sample) are reassigned from 
the formal to the informal sector and 443 individuals (another 6.3 percent of the sample) 
from the informal to the formal sector.  For Brazil the observed proportion of formal 
sector employment, using the work registration/business license criterion, is 43.1 percent 
and the estimated true proportion is 49.7 percent, practically the same as using the firm 
size criterion.  The corresponding proportions for Panama are 42.6 percent (observed) 
and 43.8 (estimated true).  To derive the estimated true proportion involves the 
reassignment of 7.8 percent of the sample for Panama.   To summarize, for Nicaragua, 
Peru, Brazil (work registration/business license) and Panama the estimated true 
proportion of individuals who work in the formal sector is greater than the observed 
proportion.    
      The estimates of the pension contribution model in Table 4 that controls for 
misclassification are significantly different from the estimates of the model without 
misclassification for all four surveys that include information on pension contribution: 
Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil and Guatemala.  I cannot reject at the 5 percent significance level 
the hypothesis that the mislassification parameters are equal to each other for Peru, but I 
                                                 
8 The estimated misclassification probabilities are applied to the observed number of 
cases in each sector and the expected numbers of individuals to be reassigned sector of 
employment are estimated.  The true proportions are calculated after reassigning those 
individuals.   15 
reject the equality hypothesis for the three other countries.  For Nicaragua, Brazil and 
Guatemala the estimated misclassification probability that an individual reported as not 
contributing is truly contributing to a pension plan exceeds the probability of the reverse 
misclassification (a1> a0).   In all cases the estimates indicate that pension contribution is 
understated in the observed data.   Perhaps some individuals tend to underreport 
participation in a program from which they will mainly benefit starting at a time that is 
decades away in the future.   
      For Nicaragua the observed pension contribution rate is 21.1 percent and the 
estimated true contribution rate is 45.6 percent. For Peru the observed rate is 14.6 percent 
and the estimated true rate is 15.3 percent.  The estimated misclassification probabilities 
for Peru are both 0.01; therefore the small change in the estimate of the true contribution 
rate is not surprising.  For Brazil, the observed pension contribution rate is 49.4 percent 
and the estimated true rate is 55.7 percent.  For Guatemala the observed rate is 23 percent 
and the estimated true rate is 53 percent; a comparable change to that found for 
Nicaragua.  For Nicaragua, Brazil and Guatemala, the observed proportion of individuals 
contributing to a pension plan is lower than the proportion working in the formal sector.  
However, the estimated true proportion contributing to a pension plan exceeds the 
estimated true proportion working in the formal sector.
9   Thus, according to these 
estimates, some individuals working in the informal sector in the three countries are 
building a degree of old-age financial security.             
      In all cases, the parameter estimates of the pension contribution probit models 
without misclassification and their standard errors are biased toward zero relative to the 
                                                 
9 Observed proportion for Guatemala.   16 
models with misclassification.  The relative bias in the estimates of the models without 
misclassification is largest for Guatemala and Nicaragua is relatively moderate for Brazil 
and is smallest (but not zero) for Peru.  The relative bias is increasing in the degree of 
misclassification.  
       For Nicaragua the estimates obtained with the sample that only uses longitudinal data 
on individuals age 15 or more who report the same gender and birth year differ 
significantly from those obtained with the larger sample of all individuals age 15 or 
more.
10   Table 4 reports the estimates obtained using the smaller sample and these should 
be less affected by measurement error in the gender and age regressors.  For Peru, the 
estimates obtained using the two samples are not significantly different from each other 
and the estimates based on the larger sample are reported in Table 4.               
      Table 5 reports the estimates of the job change models.  According to likelihood ratio 
tests, there is significant misclassification for Nicaragua and for Peru.  However, the 
probit model without misclassification does not significantly differ at the 5 percent level 
from the model with misclassification for Brazil, Guatemala and for Panama.  Individual 
misclassification parameters are significantly different from zero for Brazil and Panama 
but not for Guatemala.  Overall, however, misclassification does not have significant 
effects in the job change models for Brazil and Panama.   
      For Nicaragua the estimated misclassification probabilities are both 0.073.  The 
observed proportion of individuals changing jobs in the past year is 15 percent.  The 
estimated true rate is 20 percent.   For Peru the estimated misclassification probabilities 
are 0.278 (a0) and 0.107 (a1).   The observed proportion of individuals changing jobs is 
                                                 
10 ?
2 (7)=24.914, Pr.=0.000.      17 
49.8 percent.  Using the estimated misclassification probabilities, I estimate the true rate 
to be 41 percent.  It appears that the way the 1997 Peruvian survey elicited information 
on previous jobs in the past year using two separate questions resulted in double counting 
of some past jobs.  According to the estimates of the probit model with misclassification, 
job change is less prevalent than is observed in the Peruvian data.   
      For both Nicaragua and Peru, the parameters of the model without misclassification 
are biased toward zero and the bias is relatively large.  I use the longitudinal sample with 
no changes in gender or birth year for Nicaragua
11 but the larger sample of everyone age 
15 or over for Peru.     
      As noted above, measurement error in the schooling variable in the surveys may be 
considerable.  To investigate the possible effect of measurement error in the schooling 
regressor on the models for Nicaragua and Peru, I estimate the models with a baseline 
sample of individuals age 28 or more in the second year of the survey for whom 
longitudinal information was available and who reported no changes in gender or birth 
year over time.  These individuals would be age 25 or older in the first year of the survey 
and most of them would have completed their schooling by the first year of the survey.  I 
then compare the baseline estimates to those that use longitudinal information to correct 
for possible measurement in schooling using four alternative methods.  The four methods 
are (1) replace schooling in the second year with the average of reported schooling in the 
first and the second year, (2) drop observations with implausible changes in schooling 
over time: either a reduction in schooling over time or a gain of more than 4 years in a 
                                                 
11 The parameter estimates of the model based on the longitudinal sample, age 15 or 
more,  with no changes in gender or birth year over time differ significantly from the 
point estimates of the model based on all individuals age 15 or more, ?
2 (6)=16.290, 
Pr.=0.012.   18 
three year period, (3) use only observations with no changes in reported schooling in the 
two years, (4) replace schooling in the second year with predicted schooling using 
schooling in the first year as an instrument.
12   The first and third methods are likely to 
work better with individuals who have completed their schooling and whose reported 
changes in schooling are due to measurement error only.
13   I also control for the possible 
effects of measurement error in gender or age by using longitudinal data with no reported 
changes in gender or birth year in order to isolate the possible effect of measurement 
error in schooling.  
      I estimated the baseline probit model with mislassification for each outcome and for 
each of the two countries.  I then estimated four alternative models for each case that 
implement each of the four ways of reducing measurement error in schooling.  I then 
tested whether the baseline estimates are significantly different from the point estimates 
of each of the four alternative models.  As reported in Table 6, in all cases where the tests 
could be computed
14 the baseline estimates do not differ from the alternatives.  
Controlling for measurement error in schooling using longitudinal information does not 
significantly affect the estimates for Nicaragua and for Peru.   
      The predictions reported above rely only on the observed proportions and the 
estimated misclassification probabilities.  What is the overall impact of controlling for 
misclassification in probit models for the three labor market outcomes?  In other words, 
                                                 
12 The other regressors in the schooling regressions are an intercept, age, age squared, and 
gender. 
13 Using younger individuals who are more likely to complete additional schooling over a 
three year period would introduce measurement error in schooling (method 1) or will 
systematically exclude those who completed relatively more schooling (method 3). 
14 The tests could be computed in 22 out of 24 cases.  In two cases the model with the 
alternative measure of schooling did not converge.   19 
what happens when we take account of the effects of other regressors in the models? 
Some predictions that utilize the estimated probit parameters that are free of 
misclassification bias are useful for this purpose.  Table 7 reports probabilities predicted 
at the means of the regressors using the parameter estimates reported in Tables 3, 4, and 
5.  I present predictions (and their estimated standard errors) based on inconsistent 
estimates of the probit models without misclassification and predictions based on 
consistent estimates of the probit models with misclassification.  I do not present 
predictions in cases where the models with and without misclassification are not 
significantly different from each other.  The last panel of Table 7 reports absolute values 
of relative changes in the predictions of the probit models without and with 
misclassification relative to the predictions of the models without misclassification.  For 
Nicaragua (formal, job change), Peru (formal, pension, job change), Brazil (formal—
work registration/business license, pension) and Guatemala (pension) the absolute values 
of the changes in the predicted probabilities are in the range of 12.5-71 percent.  Two 
other predicted probabilities change modestly: Nicaragua (pension) and Panama (formal) 
with a range of 3.7-7.6 percent.  In eight out of eleven cases in this table the predicted 
probabilities change by more than 10 percent when I control for misclassification.  
Conclusion. 
    Using data from the LSMS surveys for Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala and 
Panama, I find evidence of significant misclassification in eleven of the sixteen cases that 
I investigate.   I examine three outcomes: employment in the formal sector, pension 
contribution and job change.  There is significant misclassification for all three cases 
studied for Nicaragua, all three cases for Peru, three of the four cases for Brazil, one of   20 
the three cases for Guatemala, one of the two for Panama.   Misclassification biases the 
probit coefficients toward zero and even a moderate degree of misclassification can bias 
the coefficients substantially.  My evidence indicates that there is a moderate degree of 
misclassification in the formal sector models and in some of the pension contribution and 
job change models.  In some of the pension contribution and job change models both the 
extent of misclassification and its effects are greater.   In some cases no significant 
misclassification is found; still, it is feasible and worthwhile to investigate this aspect of 
data quality because even a moderate compromise in data quality along these lines can 
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Table 1. Aspects of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Data from Nicaragua and 
Peru  
Nicaragua 1998-2001 (individuals 15 years or older in 2001) 
Different gender:  1% 
Different birth year:  34% 
Nicaragua 1998-2001 (individuals 15 years or older in 2001, same gender and birth year) 
Schooling declines over time: 22% 
Schooling increases by more than 4 years in a three year period: 3% 
Peru 1994-1997(individuals 15 years or older in 1997) 
Different gender:  6% 
Different birth year:  25% 
Peru 1994-1997 (individuals 15 years or older in 1997, same gender and birth year) 
Schooling declines over time: 17% 
Schooling increases by more than 4 years in a three year period: 2%   23 
Table 2. Summary Statistics, Living Standards Measurement Study Surveys 
                                                     Nicaragua 2001                      Peru 1997 
Variable  Mean (standard deviation)  Mean (standard deviation) 
Employment in Formal 
Sector 
0.282  0.269 
Pension contribution  0.211  0.146 
Job Change  0.150  0.498 
Age*   35.255 (15.028)   36.474 (14.711) 
Schooling*   5.238 (4.494)   8.162 (4.702) 
Female*  0.343  0.420   
Sample Size*  8002  8070 
                                                    Brazil 1996-1997                      Guatemala 2000 
Variable  Mean (standard deviation)  Mean (standard deviation) 
Employment in Formal 
Sector 
0.499  0.368 
Work Registration/Business 
License 
0.431  0.226 
Pension contribution   0.494  0.217 
Job Change  0.118   31.954 (13.514) 
Age*   34.313 (12.705)  1203.628 (1059.447) 
Schooling*   7.140 (4.404)  0.335 
Female*  0.398   9838 
Sample Size*  7023   
                                                     Panama 1997 
Variable  Mean (standard deviation) 
Employment in Formal 
Sector 
0.426 
Job Change  0.167  
Age*   37.416 (14.202) 
Schooling*   8.356 (4.758) 
Female*  0.334  
Sample Size*  7866 
* Summary statistics and sample size for formal sector sample. 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Employment in the Formal Sector 
Model   
Nicaragua 2001 




a 0     0.073 (5.089) 
a 1     0.073 (5.089) 
Constant  -1.803 (-17.063)  -2.630 (-10.239) 
Age   0.045 (7.534)   0.077 (6.076) 
Age squared  -0.0006 (-8.227)   -0.001 (-6.105) 
Schooling   0.111 (29.905)   0.147 (13.928) 
Female  -0.295 (-8.483)  -0.373 (-6.648) 
Log-likelihood  -4142.57  -4137.63 
Sample Size  8002  8002 
Peru 1997 




a 0     0.073 (10.182) 
a 1     0.073 (6.182) 
Constant  -2.437 (-20.482)  -3.726 (-14.586) 
Age   0.044  (7.126)   0.067 (5.874) 
Age squared  -0.0005 (-6.853)  -0.0009 (-5.982) 
Schooling   0.130 (32.735)   0.210 (18.194) 
Female  -0.402 (-11.696)   -0.523 (-9.166) 
Log-likelihood  -3880.989  -3859.948 
Sample Size  8070  8070 
Brazil 1996-1997 (Firm Size) 




a 0     0.126 (3.345) 
a 1     0.126 (3.345) 
Constant  -0.989 (-8.863)  -1.473 (-5.361) 
Age   0.025 (3.998)   0.039 (3.358) 
Age squared  -0.0003 (-4.872)  -0.0006 (-3.758) 
Schooling   0.108 (28.306)   0.158 (6.978) 
Female  -0.272 (-8.372)  -0.429 (-5.273)  
Log-likelihood  -4379.731  -4377.037 
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Brazil 1996-1997 (Work Registration/Business License) 




a 0     -0.013 (-0.281) 
a 1     0.116 (3.382) 
Constant  -2.265 (-18.490)  -2.418 (-7.164) 
Age   0.080 (12.093)   0.090 (6.930) 
Age squared  -0.0009 (-10.707)  -0.001 (-6.633) 
Schooling   0.122 (27.640)   0.148 (8.601) 
Female  -0.474 (-13.194)  -0.550 (-7.234)  
Log-likelihood  -3650.740  -3644.263 
Sample Size  6131  6131 
Guatemala 2000 




a 0     0.030 (0.694) 
a 1     0.139 (2.042) 
Constant  -1.099 (-12.745)  -1.181 (-5.493) 
Age   0.020 (4.035)   0.026 (3.007) 
Age squared  -0.0004 (-5.535)  -0.0005 (-3.529) 
Schooling   0.095 (29.504)   0.116 (6.529) 
Female  -0.278 (-9.610)  -0.345 (-5.293)  
Log-likelihood  -5907.846  -5906.516 
Sample Size  9838  9838 
Panama 1997 




a 0     0.078 (5.82) 
a 1     0.078 (5.82) 
Constant  -3.076 (-25.074)  -4.137 (-13.394) 
Age   0.087 (13.608)   0.115 (9.511) 
Age squared  -0.001 (-12.54)  -0.001 (-8.855) 
Schooling   0.148 (38.249)   0.204 (15.546) 
Female  -0.16 (-4.682)  -0.223 (-4.483)  
Log-likelihood  -4274.563  -4263.162 
Sample Size  7866  7866 
t-statistics in parentheses 
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Pension Contribution Model 
Nicaragua 2001 




a 0     0.042 (4.099) 
a 1     0.323 (6.275) 
Constant  -3.815 (-15.970)  -6.361 (-6.747) 
Age   0.099 (7.396)   0.195 (4.788) 
Age squared  -0.001 (-6.444)   -0.002 (-4.442) 
Schooling   0.141 (18.708)   0.261 (7.084) 
Female  0.002 (0.046)  -0.112 (-0.973) 
Log-likelihood  -1125.798  -1121.015 
Sample Size  2717  2717 
Peru 1997 




a 0     0.010 (2.919) 
a 1     0.010 (2.919) 
Constant   -4.664 (-26.312)   -5.153 (4.940) 
Age  0.101 (11.565)  0.114 (10.537) 
Age squared  -0.001 (-9.696)   -0.001 (-9.311) 
Schooling  0.159 (30.985)  0.179 (21.915) 
Female  -0.249 (-5.915)  -0.271 (-5.394) 
Log-likelihood  -2555.849  -2552.050 
Sample Size  8070  8070 
Brazil 1996-1997 




a 0     0.001 (0.041) 
a 1     0.117 (4.786) 
Constant  -2.632 (-21.710)   -2.973 (-11.146) 
Age  0.102 (15.231)  0.120 (9.760) 
Age squared  -0.001 (-13.920)   -0.001 (-9.198) 
Schooling  0.122 (30.656)  0.154 (13.072) 
Female  -0.334 (-10.038)  -0.427 (-8.487)  
Log-likelihood  -4139.774  -4130.535 
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Guatemala 2000 




a 0     0.071 (8.351) 
a 1     0.410 (16.642) 
Constant  -2.684 (-25.179)   -5.146 (-9.978) 
Age   0.736 (11.786)  0.176 (7.438) 
Age squared  -0.001 (-11.059)   -0.002 (-7.052) 
Schooling  0.101 (29.909)  0.238 (10.594) 
Female  -0.163 (-5.074)  -0.458 (-5.002)  
Log-likelihood  -4632.947  -4602.406 
Sample Size  9838  9838   28 
Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Job Change Model 
Nicaragua 2001 




a 0     0.073 (5.239) 
a 1     0.073 (5.239) 
Constant  -1.119 (-5.979)  -1.572 (-4.229) 
Age   0.028 (2.696)   0.057 (2.623) 
Age squared  -0.0004 (-2.921)   -0.0008 (-2.615) 
Schooling   -0.025 (-3.264)   -0.063 (-3.852) 
Female  -0.583 (-8.480)  -1.615 (-1.395) 
Log-likelihood  -1096.881  -1093.855 
Sample Size  2718  2718 
Peru 1997 




a 0     0.278 (11.838) 
a 1     0.103 (2.989) 
Constant   1.388 (6.934)   2.876 (4.377) 
Age  0.005 (0.546)  0.013 (0.542) 
Age squared  -0.0003 (-2.401)   -0.0007 (-2.297) 
Schooling  -0.108 (-17.092)  -0.273 (-6.284) 
Female  -0.385 (-6.881)  -0.814 (-4.431) 
Log-likelihood  -1520.986  -1507.672 
Sample Size  2464  2464 
Brazil 1996-1997 




a 0     0.031 (2.373) 
a 1     0.747 (11.328) 
Constant  -0.712 (-4.759)   1.337 (1.308) 
Age  0.008 (0.881)  0.002 (0.081) 
Age squared  -0.0003 (-2.612)   -0.0006 (-1.441) 
Schooling  -0.041 (-8.305)  -0.109 (-2.641) 
Female  -0.185 (-4.413)  -0.492 (-2.353)  
Log-likelihood  -2458.927  -2458.064 
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Guatemala 2000 




a 0     0.051 (1.526) 
a 1     0.051 (1.526) 
Constant  -0.805 (-8.758)   -0.951 (-5.708) 
Age   0.026 (4.880)  0.034 (3.532) 
Age squared  -0.0004 (-5.938)   -0.0005 (-3.838) 
Schooling  -0.025 (-7.130)  -0.033 (-4.390) 
Female  -0.540 (-16.369)  -0.706 (-4.438)  
Log-likelihood  -4952.954  -4952.590 
Sample Size  9840  9840 
Panama 1997 




a 0     0.046 (2.214) 
a 1     0.753 (36.019) 
Constant  -0.567 (-4.799)   3.089 (2.580) 
Age   0.0009 (0.138)  -0.053 (-1.610) 
Age squared  -0.0001 (-1.907)   0.00006 (0.214) 
Schooling  -0.011 (-2.720)  -0.044 (-2.195) 
Female  -0.419 (-10.640)  -1.443 (-3.307)  
Log-likelihood  -3449.856  -3446.956 
Sample Size  7881  7881 
t-statistics in parentheses   30 
 
Table 6. Specification tests 
Equality of Misclassification Parameters (a 0=a 1) 
Formal Sector  
Nicaragua ?
2 (1)=1.391, Pr.=0.238  
Peru ?
2 (1)=2.450, Pr.=0.117 
Brazil--firm size ?
2 (1)=0.638, Pr.=0.424 
Brazil--work registration, business license ?
2 (1)=10.929, Pr.=0.001 
Panama ?
2 (1)=3.821, Pr.=0.051 
 
Pension Contribution  
Nicaragua ?
2 (1)=32.408, Pr.=0.000 
Peru ?
2 (1)=2.002, Pr.=0.157 
Brazil ?
2 (1)=18.938, Pr.=0.000 
Guatemala ?
2 (1)=208.652, Pr.=0.000 
 
Job Change  
Nicaragua test cannot be computed 
Peru ?
2 (1)=3.943, Pr.=0.047 
Brazil ?
2 (1)=142.054, Pr.=0.000 
Guatemala ?
2 (1)=0.001, Pr.=0.975  
Panama ?
2 (1)=1193.337, Pr.=0.000 
 
Equality of Probit Model with Misclassification and Probit Model without 
Misclassification* 
 
Guatemala, formal sector ?
2 (2)=2.660, Pr.=0.264  
Brazil, job change ?
2 (2)=1.726, Pr.=0.422 
Guatemala, job change ?
2 (1)=0.008, Pr.=0.929  
Panama, job change ?
2 (2)=5.80, Pr.=0.055 
 
Full sample vs. Longitudinal sample with same gender, birth year in both years 
Formal Sector 
Nicaragua  ?
2 (6)=10.606, Pr.=0.101 
Peru ?
2 (6)=4.339, Pr.=0.631 
Pension Contribution 
Nicaragua ?
2 (7)=17.204, Pr.=0.016 
Peru ?
2 (6)=7.906, Pr.=0.245 
Job Change 
Nicaragua ?
2 (6)=14.534, Pr.=0.024 
Peru  ?
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Alternative schooling measures for Nicaragua, Peru:  
Baseline model: uses data with age = 28 in the second year, same gender, same birth year 
in both years, schoolingt2 included among regresors, endogenous variable schoolingt2,. 
1. average of schooling values in the two years. 
2. drop observations with schooling loss over time or gain of more than 4 years. 
3. keep only observations with schholingt1=schoolingt2. 
4. IV estimates of schoolingt2 (using schoolingt1 as an instrument). 
Nicaragua 
Formal Sector  
1. ?
2 (6)=0.639, Pr.=0.996 
2. ?
2 (6)=1.529, Pr.=0.958 
3. ?
2 (6)=5.287, Pr.=0.508 
4. ?
2 (6)=0.626, Pr.=0.996 
Pension Contribution 
1. ?
2 (7)=2.233, Pr.=0.946 
2. ?
2 (7)=1.434, Pr.=0.984 
3. ?
2 (7)=0.522, Pr.=0.999 
4. ?
2 (6)=4.993, Pr.=0.661 
Job Change  
1. ?
2 (6)=0.742, Pr.=0.994 
2. ?
2 (6)=3.608, Pr.=0.730 
3. ?
2 (6)=1.638, Pr.=0.950 
4. ?





2 (6)=3.174, Pr.=0.787 
2. test cannot be computed 
3. ?
2 (6)=8.602, Pr.=0.197 
4. ?
2 (6)=4.539, Pr.=0.604 
Pension Contribution 
1. ?
2 (7)=2.083, Pr.=0.955 
2. ?
2 (7)=2.787, Pr.=0.904 
3. ?
2 (7)=12.874, Pr.=0.075 
4. ?
2 (6)=3.772, Pr.=0.806 
Job Change 
1. ?
2 (6)=2.262, Pr.=0.894 
2. ?
2 (6)=1.571, Pr.=0.955 
3. test cannot be computed 
4. ?
2 (6)=3.028, Pr.=0.805   
____________________________________  
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Table 7. Predicted Probabilities of Formal Sector Employment, Pension 
Contribution and Job Change with and without Misclassification of the Dependent 
Variable 
Formal Sector Employment 
                                                     Probit without                          Probit with 
                                                     Misclassification                      Misclassification                                                              
Nicaragua  0.256 (0.005)  0.189 (0.017) 
Peru  0.224 (0.005)  0.122 (0.012) 
Brazil (Firm Size)  0.500 (0.006)  0.504 (0.009) 
Brazil (Work Registration/ 
Business License) 
0.458 (0.007)  0.543 (0.027) 
Panama   0.409 (0.006)  0.378 (0.011) 
Pension Contribution 
Nicaragua  0.164 (0.008)  0.158 (0.027) 
Peru   0.083 (0.004)  0.066 (0.006) 
Brazil  0.495 (0.006)  0.582 (0.022) 
Guatemala  0.200 (0.004)  0.225 (0.041) 
Job Change 
Nicaragua  0.138 (0.007)  0.040 (0.044) 
Peru  0.498 (0.011)  0.266 (0.043) 
Absolute Values of Changes in Predicted Probabilities Obtained from Probit 
without and with Misclassification Relative to Predictions from Probit without 
Misclassification  
Nicaragua, formal sector  26.2% 
Peru, formal sector  45.5 
Brazil, formal sector (Firm Size); [Work 
Registration/Business License]  
0.8 [18.6] 
Panama, formal sector  7.6 
Nicaragua, pension contribution  3.7 
Peru, pension contribution  20.5 
Brazil, pension contribution  17.6 
Guatemala, pension contribution  12.5 
Nicaragua, job change  71 
Peru, job change  12.5 
Standard errors in parentheses, predictions at the means of the regressors. 
 